Every vote counts: e-Elections in Africa

Africa has seen a dramatic expansion of electoral democracy since the early 1990s, with dozens of countries adopting multiparty elections and regular polls. In 2024, 18 countries held elections, underscoring the continent’s active political engagement. However, many of these elections have been marred by fraud, delays or contested results, fueling interest in technology to improve transparency and efficiency: In Algeria and Tunisia, incumbent presidents were re-elected with 95% and 89% of the vote, respectively, despite low voter turnout in both nations. On December 23, Mozambique’s highest court upheld the contested October 9 election results, which extended the Frelimo party’s five-decade rule and plunged the country into turmoil.

Adoption of E-Voting in African Countries

E-voting and related technologies are now widespread across Africa. In 2022, 35 of 54 African countries were using biometric or electronic technologies in elections. These range from biometric voter registration and accreditation (fingerprint/face scanners) to electronic vote counting and online result transmission. 

In 2014 Namibia became the first African country to hold a national election using electronic voting machines (EVMs). The Electoral Commission of Namibia (ECN) had amended the electoral law as early as 2009 to allow EVMs, and piloted machines in several local elections in 2014 before fully deploying them in the November 28, 2014 general elections. The EVMs (direct-recording machines) replaced paper ballots, with votes entered on a touch-screen and dropped into a sealed box. Provided by India’s Bharat Electronics, the machines were credited with speeding up the count and avoiding spoiled ballots. Namibia has continued to use EVMs in subsequent elections, even amid some skepticism – demonstrating a national-level commitment to this technology.

Kenya has emphasized biometric voter registration (BVR) and electronic results transmission rather than replacing paper ballots. Beginning with pilots in 2009 and mandated by post-2007 electoral reforms, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) introduced laptop-based BVR systems to capture voters’ names, ID numbers, photos and fingerprints. Over the 2013–2022 period this boosted Kenya’s voter roll from 14.3 million to over 22.1 million. On election day, voters’ fingerprints are verified on-site, but ballots are still paper-based. Crucially, Kenya also implemented electronic results transmission: after counting at each polling station, officials photograph the official tally form (Form 34A) and upload it digitally to a national portal. The system was revamped for 2022 after previous failures; now the digital images are cross-checked against the physical forms at higher levels to detect fraud. Thus Kenya’s “Integrated Elections Management System” leverages ICT for registration, identification and result reporting. 

Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has been gradually adopting technology since 2015. It introduced a new smart Permanent Voter’s Card (PVC) with an embedded biometric microchip for registration, and began using electronic card readers on polling day. These devices scan each voter’s card, display their photo, and verify fingerprints against the PVC to prevent multiple voting. On the results side, INEC has explored e-transmission but faces legal hurdles (debated in the 2022 Electoral Act). Some sub-national elections have experimented with EVMs: notably, Kaduna State’s local elections in 2018 and 2021 used electronic voting machines and biometric accreditation, with authorities touting them as more credible. 

However, at the federal level INEC’s push for electronic results transmission has been blocked by the Senate (citing network limits), despite INEC studies finding over 90% coverage. During the 2023 general elections, INEC deployed the Bi-modal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) to verify voters’ identities using fingerprints and facial recognition. INEC received 11,355 BVAS machines for accrediting voters at over 180,000 polling units.

Additionally, the INEC Results Viewing (IReV) portal was used to upload and display polling unit results electronically. Voters still casted their ballots using paper ballots, and the counting process was conducted manually. The Electoral Act 2022 permits INEC to introduce electronic voting, but such a system was not adopted for the 2023 elections. Nigeria’s case shows partial adoption (BVR, card readers) but continuing debates over full e-voting.

To date, South Africa has not used e-voting machines in elections, but is actively investigating the technology. In early 2025 the Electoral Commission (IEC) held a conference with experts from Estonia, Namibia and elsewhere to study feasibility. In the Policy discussion document entitled “Exploring the Implementation of Electronic Voting in South Africa”, the IEC notes potential benefits (easier access, fewer errors, lower costs) but also warns that any digital system must be demonstrably more efficient and secure than paper. In line with the document, key challenges for e-voting implementation include significant technological requirements such as secure infrastructure and voter-verifiable audit trails. The digital divide, particularly in rural areas with poor connectivity and lower digital literacy, presents a major obstacle. Furthermore, cybersecurity concerns like data breaches and hacking, alongside the need for extensive training in managing and operating these systems, are critical issues to address. 

South Africa’s Constitution requires any system to be “simple, accurate, verifiable, secure, accountable and transparent,” and the IEC has already implemented ICT in voter registration (online registration) and verification (barcode scanners), and used SMS and online portals for provisional voting status. The IEC is reportedly preparing pilot tests of supervised e-voting and internet voting. 

Several others have deployed parts of e-voting systems. Ghana, for instance, uses biometric voter ID cards and has made trials on electronic result uploads. Tunisia and Lesotho have used BVR; Sierra Leone and others allow overseas internet voting for civilians abroad. In 2018, with UNDP/EU funding, Zimbabwe Electoral Commission implemented a new biometric voter registration. UNDP reports that 5.69 million voters were registered on the new system. In 2020, under UNDP’s electoral support program in Zambia, Smartmatic was contracted to roll out a nationwide biometric voter registration. The system used fingerprint/face scanners and captured data for ~7 million voters.

In sum, African adoption is highly uneven – ranging from Namibia’s full EVM rollout to Kenya’s hybrid BVR/results system, to South Africa’s research phase. Many countries (Botswana, Algeria, Cameroon, etc.) are discussing pilots or reforms, but as of 2025 few have fully embraced election machines or internet voting in practice.

Key challenges

Reliable power and broadband are essential for any e-voting scheme. Yet many African countries have stark divides: rural areas often lack stable electricity or mobile data. The Senate of Nigeria cited UN communications data that only ~50% of polling sites have 3G coverage. CIPESA notes that Africa’s persistent digital divide “remains a significant barrier to inclusive political participation,” with poor connectivity and high costs especially affecting rural and marginalized communities. In practice, this means e-voting pilots tend to be confined to cities or wealthier regions, or require costly measures (satellite links, generators) for remote polling stations. Without massive infrastructure investment, citizens without internet or even radio may be systematically excluded by e-voting systems.

Security is arguably the biggest concern. Electronic systems must be protected against hacking, malware and insider tampering. African EMBs often lack deep cybersecurity capacity, making systems vulnerable. EISA and other observers warn that if voting machines or servers are compromised, there is no transparent paper trail. For instance, Russia’s blockchain voting trials suffered outages and unverified code, prompting calls to ban e-voting. In Africa, mistrust runs high: any unexplained delay or result reversal can be seen as fraud. Citizens often view e-voting as unreliable, and political parties may question its legitimacy if not clearly authorized by law. Cyber-threats also include denial-of-service attacks on result servers, or data theft of voter databases. Thus establishing trust is a crucial hurdle: any breach or even rumor of manipulation can undermine an entire election’s credibility.

Alongside infrastructure, voters and even election workers may lack the skills to use e-voting tools. Studies show that digital literacy lags in many African countries, especially among older, rural and less-educated populations. CIPESA highlights that expensive devices and low literacy compound political inequalities, limiting people’s ability to engage with e-voting or to verify results. Training poll workers and educating citizens is therefore vital, but requires time and resources. Without it, voters may make mistakes at machines, spoil ballots, or simply distrust the process. Moreover, marginalized groups (women, minority languages) may be inadvertently disenfranchised if interfaces are not fully accessible.

In many African contexts, electoral reform is inherently political. Political parties and leaders may resist changes that threaten their advantage. As Maphunye observes, most African governments have been “cautious” about wholesale ICT transformations, partly due to political unwillingness or citizen skepticism. In practice, this plays out as legislative pushback: in Nigeria, the Senate has repeatedly blocked full e-transmission of results, arguing that technology could be misused. In Zimbabwe (2013), an attempt to introduce EVMs was scrapped amid allegations of fraud and opposition from key parties. Even when elections have high fraud risk, incumbents may prefer opaque counting if they doubt technology. Conversely, opposition groups sometimes portray any ICT failure as deliberate manipulation, as happened in Kenya’s 2017 vote. Thus, building broad political consensus is critical; technology reforms often require buy-in from all major stakeholders, which can be hard to achieve.

E-voting systems entail high upfront and maintenance costs: machines, software, secure networks, and continual technical support. Many African election budgets are limited, and governments often rely on external donors or loans to fund new systems. For example, Kenya’s initial election tech rollouts had significant UNDP and IFES support. Dependence on donors can create ownership issues and sustainability problems if support wanes. Additionally, opaque procurement processes have led to expensive, sometimes corrupt deals, wasting scarce funds. Donor agendas may also influence technology choice, which might not align perfectly with local needs. Ultimately, without dependable funding – whether from government or transparent PPPs – scaling e-voting nationwide is challenging.

Continental and Regional Initiatives

Recognizing that digital identity and election tech have cross-border dimensions, African institutions have begun promoting harmonization of policies and standards. For example, the African Union’s Interoperability Framework for Digital ID aims to create continental standards for legal identity credentials. Under this framework, AU Member States agree on minimum standards so that a citizen’s national ID can be recognized digitally across countries. In theory, such unified digital ID systems could later support secure online voting or identity verification in elections, though the framework’s implementation is still in early stages.

At the AU and Regional Economic Community (REC) level, election support organizations like the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) and International IDEA run peer-learning programs where election administrators share ICT best practices. The AU’s 2019 and 2021 Summits included sessions on “Harmonization of ICT and Digital Policies,” emphasizing a pan-African digital market. These efforts do not yet form a specific e-voting protocol, but they lay groundwork: for instance, harmonized standards for e-payments and digital services could be extended to electoral technologies. Some RECs (e.g. ECOWAS, SADC) have draft model laws on elections that mention ICTs, though member states still adopt these nationally. In short, continental initiatives are moving toward common digital infrastructure (like IDs and internet access) and legal frameworks, which over time may facilitate interoperable e-voting systems. However, no single Africa-wide electoral tech policy yet exists – the emphasis remains on dialogue, training and alignment of legal principles (e.g. endorsing the Malabo Convention on data protection).

ECOWAS has promoted a common biometric ID for member states. In 2015 ECOWAS approved the ECOWAS National Biometric ID Card (ENBIC) for free movement of citizens. Senegal first issued this card (also acting as travel/residence ID), with Ghana and Nigeria following. This harmonized ID scheme facilitates reliable voter identification across West Africa. ECOWAS also enshrines electoral commitments in its democracy protocols, and frequently deploys regional election observation missions (e.g. recent missions to Liberia, Sierra Leone, etc.).

SADC has integrated technology into its election norms. The SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (2015) note the “increasing use of technology in electoral management and administration” and call for strengthened observer capacity to handle it. SADC also operates the SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) and a forum of national electoral commissions to share best practices. SADC missions and peer-review workshops routinely advise on new tools like electronic voting or transmission.

EAC, through its Secretariat and summit decisions, emphasizes peaceful, transparent elections. EAC Election Observer Missions (e.g. to Uganda 2021) have focused on technology use: Uganda’s mission noted isolated failures of biometric voter verification kits and recommended legal frameworks for election tech. In 2024 the EAC joined with the EU to accelerate a regional digital transformation roadmap, covering e-governance and cross-border digital IDs. That will also underpin future e-election systems.

International Partners and Technology Providers

A number of international actors and vendors fund and equip Africa’s e-voting ecosystem. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) is a major funder and technical advisor for African elections. Its Global Program for Electoral Cycle Support often finances biometric registration, voter education and polling improvements. For example, UNDP provided extensive technical and financial support for Zimbabwe’s 2018 biometric voter register, and has backed Zambia’s and Uganda’s biometric voter systems. UNDP projects typically bundle capacity-building (training of EMB staff) with procurement of digital equipment. 

IFES (International Foundation for Electoral Systems), a private USA-based NGO works with election officials across more than 20 African countries. Its role is mainly technical assistance: advising on law, procurement of equipment, training on electronic systems, and civic outreach. IFES frequently assists with the design of biometric roll-outs and transparent tabulation processes (often funded by USAID or other donors).

The European Union (EU), through its external action service and development funds, is a major backer of democratic governance in Africa. It provides grants for electoral projects (staff training, observation, ICT infrastructure) and often co-funds UNDP programs. For instance, the EU contributed ~USD 8.8 mln to Zimbabwe’s 2018 electoral assistance alongside UNDP. The EU also sponsors regional initiatives (e.g. the EU–EAC Digital Transformation Programme) that indirectly strengthen e-voting frameworks by boosting e-government interoperability.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is a longstanding sponsor of African electoral assistance. USAID funds NGOs (e.g. IFES, NDI, IRI) and local observers (like Southern Africa’s EISA) to promote election transparency. In technological terms, USAID grants have underwritten the introduction of new equipment (e.g. electronic polling kits in Liberia, consolidated result portals in Ghana) and the training needed to use them. USAID also supports the “global community of practice” on observation and technology standards.

The World Bank’s Identity for Development (ID4D) project provides loans and grants to countries upgrading civil registries. A notable example is Nigeria, where ID4D funding helped the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) to purchase and deploy an advanced biometric ID system (with IDEMIA) to register over 90 million citizens. Such foundational ID systems directly feed into secure voter registers and e-voting programs.

Smartmatic, a private company with head offices in the UK and USA, supplies complete election technologies (hardware and software) and has been active across Africa. It has provided biometric voter registration/verification for Uganda, Zambia, Sierra Leone, and is under contract for Liberia and Zambia elections. For example, Smartmatic assisted Uganda’s 2016 polls with 30,000 biometric ID devices and partnered with UNDP in Zambia to register 7 million voters by 2021. Smartmatic generally enters long-term procurement contracts (government funded) and includes training local staff in its deployments.

IDEMIA (Morpho), a private French company provides biometric enrollment kits, ID cards and finger/face-scan devices. It has supplied many African elections – notably in Ghana (new biometric voter machines) and Nigeria (NIMC ID system). IDEMIA often works through government procurements, sometimes co-funded by aid programs. Nigeria’s 2024 biometric database upgrade (by IDEMIA) was supported by a World Bank ID4D credit.

A number of smaller companies and consortia are also involved. For example, Ghanaian-based Laxton Group was contracted to supply Liberia’s biometric voter registration kit. Belgian firm Zetes and others have supplied e-ID and e-voter registration systems in West Africa. Private consultants (often funded by donors) provide software development and system integration, while international auditors verify the technology.

Regulatory Landscape

Africa’s regulatory environment for e-voting is highly fragmented. National electoral laws vary: some explicitly allow technology, others are silent or restrictive. For instance, Kenya’s Election Act (2011) permits the IEBC “to use such technology as it considers appropriate” in elections, and its Constitution (2010) stipulates that any system used must be “accurate, verifiable, secure, accountable and transparent.” This clear legal mandate helped Kenya adopt BVR and digital transmission. By contrast, Nigeria’s election laws until recently neither allowed nor prohibited e-transmission; only through legislative amendment did the House propose legalizing results upload, although the Senate stalled this in 2021. South Africa’s Electoral Act currently requires paper ballot counting, so a legal change would be needed to authorize electronic polls. Countries like Namibia and Burkina Faso amended their laws (via parliament) to permit EVMs ahead of their pilots. In many states, uncertainty or lack of explicit legal authority has led EMBs to proceed cautiously or to await court guidance.

Judicial and legal challenges have already arisen in some cases. Kenya’s 2017 presidential result was annulled by the Supreme Court in part on grounds of “irregularities” in the electronic results transmission. The court ordered a new poll, highlighting that technology failures (e.g. incomplete tallying) can trigger legal disputes. In Nigeria, the Senate’s rejection of electronic transmission was justified by the telecom regulator’s data, but the Electoral Commission has since published a position paper arguing 93% coverage exists. These examples show that courts and parliaments are active arenas for contesting e-voting. Any future malfunctions or suspicions of manipulation could lead to lawsuits that delay or invalidate elections.

In parallel, data protection and cybersecurity laws are emerging across Africa, which impact e-voting. As elections generate massive personal data (biometric and demographic), many countries now have privacy laws. Kenya’s Data Protection Act (2019) specifically covers electoral data, requiring informed consent and safeguards. Nigeria’s NDPR (2019) and South Africa’s POPIA (2013, in force 2020) also regulate personal data use. However, enforcement is uneven, and most countries have not tailored these laws to elections. On cybersecurity, the AU’s Malabo Convention (2014) sets a continent-wide standard for cybercrime and data protection, but only 15 countries have ratified it. Absent strong frameworks, EMBs often rely on ad hoc IT regulations. This legal patchwork means that two countries might have very different requirements for how voting devices are procured, how voter data is stored, or how breaches are punished.

Finally, there are gaps in standards and oversight. Unlike technologies such as SIM cards (which follow GSM standards), there is no single international standard for e-voting equipment. African EMBs typically adopt proprietary machines or software, with no common certification across borders. This makes cross-national auditing or mutual recognition difficult. It also raises questions about independence: if an EMB is subject to political pressure (as in some countries), it may select systems favoring the incumbent. Ensuring EMBs remain autonomous in choosing, testing and auditing technology is therefore a key governance challenge.

In summary, Africa’s legal landscape for e-voting is uneven. Some countries have enabling provisions (Kenya, Namibia), others have restrictive or ambiguous rules. Data privacy regimes are growing but untested in elections. Without harmonized protocols or robust oversight, each country must forge its own path, often scrambling to fill gaps during electoral crises.

Recommendations

• Phased Implementation: Rather than nationwide rollouts, EMBs should pilot new technologies in controlled settings (e.g. local elections or a subset of constituencies), evaluate results, then scale up. Namibia’s approach – piloting EVMs in by-elections before the 2014 general election– is instructive. Similarly, Kenya introduced BVR gradually starting in 2009, building to full adoption by 2013. A stepwise plan allows lessons learned (and unexpected glitches) to be addressed before full deployment. It also gives time for legal frameworks to catch up and for regulators to develop policies.
• Public-Private Partnerships: Governments should engage credible technology partners, ideally including local ICT firms, under transparent contracts. For example, Ghana developed much of its biometric registration system in partnership with diaspora investors and local tech companies. Such partnerships can reduce costs and ensure local capacity. Crucially, the procurement process must be open and competitive, with clear audit trails. Independent observation of tenders (possibly by electoral observers or civil society) can deter corruption. Corruption in procurement is “a major obstacle” to e-voting success. Transparent procurement – including publishing contracts and source code for public scrutiny – will build trust. Some countries (like India’s use of open-source EVM software) offer models for transparency.

• Digital Literacy and Citizen Engagement: Voter education campaigns are essential whenever new voting technology is introduced. EMBs should launch nationwide training on how to use machines or apps, along with public demos and debates. This can reduce errors and dispel myths. Civil society and the media can collaborate to explain the system in simple terms. CIPESA’s State of Internet Freedom report stresses investing in digital literacy as a key reform: “reduce the cost of access, promotion of digital literacy, and building resilient digital infrastructure”. Practically, this means funding training for both election staff and the general population, especially in remote areas, so that no one is left behind. Engaging religious, community and youth groups can amplify outreach.
• Transparent Procurement and Audit Systems: Beyond procurement, elections must be audit-ready. Technologies should produce voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT) or digital logs that can be audited after the vote. For instance, wherever e-voting machines are used, there should be a paper backup that observers can physically count. If results are transmitted electronically, local results (like Kenya’s Form 34A photos) should be cross-checked against physical tallies. Independent audit bodies (or even parallel vote tabulation by accredited observers) can provide confidence. International IDEA recommends that EMBs document every step of the e-voting process and allow third-party testing of systems. In short, each aspect of the technology – procurement, deployment, tallying – must be as transparent as possible. This also means clear incident response plans: specifying how to revert to paper voting if machines fail, to avoid confusion.

• Regional Capacity-Building: African organizations should pool resources to train election officials in ICT. For example, AU and RECs could fund regional “e-voting academies” or workshops (similar to those for biometric ID). Sharing best practices and even equipment (through grants or loans) can lower costs. The AU’s digital policy harmonization meetings are a start. Donor agencies (UNDP, IFES, USAID) often fund election technology support; they could coordinate to ensure standardized training modules. Over time, a regional certification (e.g. “e-voting readiness”) might emerge, helping EMBs learn from each other’s successes and failures.

Russian experience

Russia’s recent experience offers useful parallels and contrasts. Beginning in 2019, Russia’s Central Election Commission experimented with remote electronic voting in regional polls (notably the Moscow City Duma). In 2020 it extended online voting to constitutional referenda in Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod. Crucially, in May 2020 President Putin signed a federal law formally introducing “remote electronic voting” into Russia’s legal system. The law defined e-voting as voting “without paper” via special software, and even integrated Russia’s national ID platform (the Gosuslugi portal) for functions like gathering candidate signatures. In other words, Russia used its strong digital ID infrastructure to link citizens securely to online polls.

Russia also tested blockchain-based voting during its 2021 parliamentary elections. Two online systems – one by Moscow city and one by telecom giant Rostelecom – were piloted. The idea was that blockchain’s immutability could enhance transparency. However, immediate problems arose: observers reported that the online vote tallies inexplicably lagged or “collapsed,” with digital results only posted hours after polls closed. Critics noted that blockchain alone could not prevent fundamental fraud: “blockchain can provide a single source of ‘truth’, [but] it does not prove that the data added is valid”.

Implementation of e-voting in Russia demonstrates legal and institutional preparedness. Russia passed national legislation explicitly allowing e-voting before full implementation. By tying e-voting to the Gosuslugi digital ID system, Russia ensured every online voter was authenticated through a robust national registry African countries with strong ID systems (e.g. Nigeria’s BVN, Kenya’s Huduma Namba) could similarly link e-voting to their national ID, reducing fraud. 

The Russian trials underscored that sophisticated threats will target e-voting. The hours-long “system collapse” in 2021, and prior system crashes, illustrate that even state-of-the-art platforms can fail under load or attack. Moreover, the idea that a single machine failure can flip an election means that multi-layer scrutiny (paper backups, parallel counts) is essential.